This paper examines the consequences of salience for the government provision of public goods. Salience is a common behavioral bias whereby people's attention is drawn to salient features of a decision problem, leading them to overweight prominent information in subsequent judgments. We analyze the case in which the public's demand for the good is distorted by salient events, and explore how salience influences public good allocation and efficiency. Theoretical predictions regarding public good allocation depend on the magnitude of the change in payoffs and the extent of salience effects. We test whether salience increases allocation of government projects to reduce wildfire severity near wildland-adjacent communities. Even though the occurrence of a wildfire reduces the severity of future fires in the same area, it may increase the likelihood that fuels management projects are placed nearby if wildfire events strongly increase the salience of losses under future fires. We find evidence that the salience effects increase the likelihood of fuels management projects and use robustness checks to eliminate competing explanations for our results. Our salience framework may also offer insights into government responses to terrorism, natural disasters, disease outbreaks, and environmental catastrophes.
Introduction
Economists have identified many reasons why governments may fail to provide the socially optimal amount of public goods, including rent seeking (Gradstein, 1993) , tax competition (Bucovetsky, Marchand, & Pestieau, 1998; Janeba & Wilson, 2011) , political decision-making (Romer & Rosenthal, 1979; Barseghyan & Coate, 2014) , and overlapping market areas (Hochman, Pines, & Thisse, 1995) , among others. This paper examines another obstacle to efficient provision stemming from the government's reliance on the public to provide unbiased information about the benefits derived from public goods. To achieve the Samuelson (1954) condition, the government needs to know the demand for the good by each member of the public. The fact that government provision is required is an indication that markets for the public good are unlikely to exist, and thus that the government will not have market data at its disposal to determine preferences. An alternative is for the government to elicit preferences from the public. However, elicited preferences may not always reveal the true benefits from public goods. Samuelson recognized this problem, noting that "it is in the selfish interest of each person to give false signals, to pretend to have less interest in given collective consumption activities than he really has." Another source of "false signals" is that public preferences may be affected by behavioral biases.
We consider the case in which demands for public goods are distorted by salient events. Salience is a common behavioral bias whereby people's attention is drawn to salient features of a decision problem, leading them to overweight prominent information in subsequent judgments (Taylor & Thompson, 1982) . Empirical evidence from economics shows that salience affects human decisionmaking in a broad range of situations. Consumers are found to be less responsive to changes in price if those prices occur through increased shipping and handling charges (Hossain & Morgan, 2006) and stock prices are less responsive to earnings reports when they are issued on Fridays, when investors are likely to be less attentive (DellaVigna & Pollet, 2009) . Consumers are more responsive to tax changes when they are more openly exhibited (eg. Finkelstein, 2009; Chetty, Looney, & Kroft, 2009; Cabral & Hoxby, 2012) . Sexton (2015) found evidence that when utility customers are enrolled in an automatic bill-pay program, which lowers price salience, they are more likely to consume greater amounts of energy. Consistent with salience theory, firm managers respond to local hurricanes by increasing corporate cash holdings (Dessaint & Matray, 2017) .
Salient events can bias the preferences expressed by the public, resulting in the inefficient provision of public goods. As an illustration of this idea, consider the government's response to terrorism. Terrorist attacks raise fears among the public about the reoccurrence of attacks and have often been followed by military operations and government investment in security. Viewed through the lens of salience, one can think of an attack as focusing the public's attention on the losses that would be incurred under a future attack. To the extent that these losses stand out from payoffs in other states of the world, the public may overstate the expected benefits of government actions to reduce threats of future attacks. One can envision a similar mechanism at work with government provision of public goods following natural disasters, disease outbreaks, and environmental catastrophes.
We formalize the notion of salience in a simple model of public good provision. In our model, the government allocates a local public good to a community based on expected benefits elicited from the residents. 1 The benefits are expressed as a two-state lottery, and we assume that one of the payoffs is altered by an exogenous shock. Applying the mechanism in Bordalo, Gennaioli, & Shleifer (2012b) , the change in the payoff raises its salience and results in a re-weighting of the state probabilities. This affects the expected benefits from the public good and the amount 1 In practice, preference elicitation can take several forms. The government may use survey methods, such as contingent valuation (Mitchell & Carson, 1989) , or preferences may be revealed by behavior in related markets and recoverable by hedonic price or travel costs methods (e.g., Freeman (1993) ). Alternatively, the government may elicit preferences through such means as public hearings or contacts with citizens and elected officials, or from voting results (Osborne & Turner, 2010) . Our theoretical results are also robust to the possibility that government officials themselves are affected by salience.
allocated by the government. The theoretical model is used to derive two results. First, we find the conditions under which allocation of the public good increases or decreases following the shock. An important insight for the empirical analysis that follows is that even if the shock lowers the payoff, expected benefits and the public good allocation can increase. Second, we show that in general the government allocation will be inefficient.
We estimate the effects of salience on public good provision with an empirical analysis of government projects to reduce wildfire severity. Federal agencies in the U.S., including the U.S. Forest
Service, manage 250 million hectares of wildlands. A central activity for these agencies is controlling wildfire, on which they spend approximately $3 billion annually (Gorte, 2013) . Of this amount, roughly $0.5 billion is allocated to pre-fire fuels management projects, which involve removing fuels from the landscape through mechanical thinning and controlled burns. The goal of these projects is to reduce the severity of wildfires when they occur. 2 We analyze whether projects are more likely to be placed near communities that have experienced a recent wildfire. Because fire is a contagion process whose spread depends on fuel availability, wildfires have the same effect as fuels management projects -namely, they reduce the volume of fuels and thus the severity of future fires in an
area. Yet, despite the fact that wildfires reduce fire risk, our theory suggests that salient wildfires may lead the public to overstate the benefits of fuels management projects. This may result in public agencies locating projects close to communities that have lower risk because of recent close wildfires.
We identify the effects of salience with a rich panel data set on all fuels management projects on federal forest lands in the western U.S. between 2003 and 2011. The dependent variable in our empirical model is a binary indicator for whether a fuels management project was implemented on a given plot of land (cell i) in year t. We focus on cells that are close to wildland-adjacent communities, which are potentially vulnerable to damages from wildfire. We think of wildlandadjacent communities as being "treated" when a wildfire occurs close by and test how treatment changes the probability of fuels management near the treated community. We measure effects in the year of the fire and for several years following the fire. Our specification includes grid cell fixed effects to control for time-invariant determinants of fuels management decisions, such as fire hazard and proximity to assets at risk, 3 and year-by-region fixed effects to control for timetrending unobservables, such as changes in fuel moisture content. We find strong evidence that fuels management projects are more likely to be placed near treated wildland-adjacent communities.
Our main results are robust to different definitions of "close" fires and projects, alternative ways of clustering standard errors, corrections for serial correlation, inclusion of placebo one-and two-year leads, and changes in the sample.
An alternative explanation for our empirical results is that government agencies use the occurrence of wildfires to learn about risks from future fires, as in the application to flooding by Gallagher (2014) . We use two approaches to rule out learning as a competing explanation for our results.
First, the fixed effects in our model control for all time-invariant and region-level time-varying determinants of fire risk. The regions are defined as sufficiently small areas (e.g., ranger districts) so that there should be little within-region variation in fire risk trends. Second, we incorporate into the model a time-varying measure of vegetation condition that indicates potential wildfire severity. We show that the effect of a nearby fire on the likelihood of a fuels management project does not vary with the vegetation condition, as would be expected if the fire informed managers about the risk of future fires. In addition, we provide further support for the salience mechanism
by showing that effects of close wildfires are magnified near communities with greater population and more housing units. Consistent with salience theory, our tests show that close wildfires treat 3 Fire hazard refers to the conditions on the landscape that affect fire behavior, including vegetation type and terrain. Fire risk is the probability that natural resources, structures, etc., are destroyed by wildfire.
the residents of wildland-adjacent communities and that fuels management decisions depend on the risks perceived by these residents rather than objective risks.
In the next section, we present the theoretical model. Section 3 describes the data used in our empirical study, and section 4 presents the main empirical specification and results, followed by a series of sensitivity analyses, robustness checks, and evaluation of learning as an alternative to salience. Conclusions are in the final section.
Theory
Our model builds on recent papers by Bordalo, Gennaioli, & Shleifer who provide a formal model of the effects of salience on individual decision making. In their work, salience is represented by a function that compares each attribute of a good to a reference level in order to determine how much that attribute "stands out". A salience parameter determines the degree to which the salient attribute is weighted in determining the consumer's valuation of the good. This model is used to explain commonly observed behavioral biases such as context-dependent willingness-to-pay (Bordalo, Gennaioli, & Shleifer, 2013) and endowment effects (Bordalo, Gennaioli, & Shleifer, 2012a) . Our analysis draws, in particular, on Bordalo, Gennaioli, & Shleifer (2012b) , who apply salience theory to choice under risk. The authors use their model to explain long-observed behavioral anomalies such as the Allais paradox and preference reversals, to account for risk-averse and risk-seeking behavior by the same individual, and to explain under-and over-weighting of highly unlikely events.
Our paper extends the work of Bordalo, Gennaioli, & Shleifer, which focuses on individual decisionmaking with respect to private goods, to public goods where government provision is required.
The decision-maker in our model is a government agency that provides a local public good to a community of N residents. The cost of allocating Q units of the good is C(Q), where C > 0, C > 0. The public good provides constant marginal benefits b to individuals within the community.
Thus, total benefits from Q units of the public good are B(Q) = N bQ. The marginal benefit b is a random variable whose value depends on the future state of the world. We assume there are two states, denoted i = {1, 2}, and define b i as the marginal benefit in state i. The states of the world occur with probability π i > 0, and thus the benefits from the public good can be represented by the lottery {(π 1 , b 1 ), (π 2 , b 2 )}, where π 2 = 1 − π 1 . The lottery's payoffs are assumed to be private information known only by the community's residents. We discuss, below, the extension of the model to the case where government officials are affected by salient events.
There are two time periods. At the start of each period, the agency elicits preferences for the public good from residents of the community 4 and allocates the good to maximize expected net benefits. We allow for residents to be "local thinkers" in the terminology of Bordalo, Gennaioli, & Shleifer (2012b) , meaning they overweight salient payoffs in determining the expected value of the public good. As the government agency must rely on the revealed or stated preferences of the residents, the agency's estimate of the expected benefits from the public good embeds the effects of salience. 5 Therefore, the agency allocates Q units of the public good such that C (Q) = NẼ(b), whereẼ(b) represents the expected value of b as expressed by residents of the community. In results presented below, we contrast the public good allocation based onẼ(b) with the allocation that uses
, which is computed with the objective probabilities π 1 and π 2 . Bordalo, Gennaioli, & Shleifer (2012b) model the psychological effects of salience in three stages.
First, decision-makers rank the salience of possible states of the world according to a salience function. Importantly, the salience function has the ordering property: the salience of a state is increasing in the distance between the payoffs across lotteries. Second, based on the salience-rank k i ∈ {1, 2, ...} of state i, where lower integers indicate more salient states, the probability of state i is distorted toπ i = ω i π i , where:
The parameter δ ∈ (0, 1] captures the degree to which salience distorts the decision weights.
When δ = 1, ω i = 1 for all i and there is no distortion of the objective probabilities. As δ tends toward zero, the decision-maker places more and more weight on a lottery's most salient payoffs.
Third, decision-makers choose among lotteries according to their expected values calculated with the weighted probabilitiesπ i . 6
In our two-period model, we assume that the payoffs from the public good change as the result of an exogenous shock occurring between periods 1 and 2. In general, the shock could change either or both of the payoffs b i . However, for simplicity and because it is consistent with our empirical application, we consider a change only in the state 1 payoff: payoff b 1 changes to b 1 in period 2, while b 2 is the same in both periods. By the ordering property of the salience function, state 1 is more salient than state 2 because the shock produces a non-zero difference in the state 1 payoff between periods 1 and 2. Thus, the salience ranking for the time 2 lottery is (k 1 , k 2 ) = (1, 2). The weighting functions for state probabilities are then given by:
It follows that when δ < 1, ω 1 > 1 and ω 2 < 1 and, thus,π 1 > π 1 andπ 2 < π 2 . The shock to payoffs leads to an over-weighting of the payoff in the salient state.
We use the model to derive two results. The first considers whether the shock increases or decreases the provision of the public good to the community. The second result examines whether the allocation of the public good is efficient. To derive the first result, we assume that the period 1 provision of the public good is based on the expected value E * (b), derived with the objective probabilities π 1 and π 2 . This assumption is not essential, as we could allow for these probabilities to depart from their true values as a result of earlier salience effects. What is critical for this result is just that the shock distorts the period 1 probabilities. However, for the second result it is essential that we use E * (b) to determine the efficient allocation of the public good.
Result 1. If b 2 − b 1 > 0, the agency will increase (decrease) the provision of the public good when δ > m (δ < m). If b 2 − b 1 < 0, the agency will increase (decrease) the provision of the public good when δ < m (δ > m), where:
Proof. A proof is provided for the case b 2 − b 1 > 0. An parallel argument is used for b 2 − b 1 < 0.
According to the agency's allocation rule, the amount of the public good provided is increasing in its expected value. Therefore, the amount provided will increase (decrease) ifẼ(b) > E * (b) (Ẽ(b) < E * (b)). Express the inequalities asπ 1 b 1 +π 2 b 2 ≷ π 1 b 1 + π 2 b 2 and rearrange to obtain
and rearrange to obtain δ > m (δ < m).
We highlight a result for the case b 2 − b 1 < 0 that matches our empirical application to wildfire.
The state 1 payoff b 1 corresponds to the benefits of fuels reduction when a wildfire occurs, which naturally are larger than the benefits when a fire does not occur (b 2 ). The shock is a wildfire between periods 1 and 2, which reduces the losses under a future fire by removing fuels from the landscape and decreasing fire severity. This reduces the marginal benefits of fuels reduction projects when a fire occurs (b 1 < b 1 ). However, it also increases the salience of the state 1 payoff. If the salience effect is strong enough (δ is sufficiently small), then enough weight can be shifted to the higher state 1 payoff to raise the public's expected value for fuels management. 7 Thus, we might find an increase in the allocation of fuels management following a fire (δ < m), even though the true expected value of fuels reduction projects has declined.
Result 2. Salience leads to an inefficient allocation of the public good except when b 1 = b 2 or δ = 1.
Proof. Given the change to payoff 1, the efficient allocation of the public good should be based on the expected benefit E * (b) = π 1 b 1 + π 2 b 2 . However, the agency will elicit the valueẼ(b) from residents of community, resulting in an over-or under-allocation of the good asẼ
The latter condition obtains only when δ = 1.
When the salience parameter equals 1 or the payoffs in the two states are the same, the probability weights do not affect the allocation decision. Otherwise, when b 1 < b 2 , a larger weight will be put on the smaller payoff (b 1 ), resulting a smaller expected value and an under-allocation of the public good. The opposite result obtains when b 1 > b 2 .
Our theory assumes that the preferences of residents are distorted by salient events. Another possibility is that government officials themselves are influenced by salience. In this case, if the government's objective is still to maximize expected net benefits derived by local residents, then the results of our model carry through. 8 Similar to the example discussed above, a salient wildfire can lead the government to over-estimate the expected benefit of allocating fuels management projects in an area that just experienced a wildfire. Whether salient events affect residents or government officials, a testable implication of our theory is that salience effects will vary with characteristics of the communities receiving the public good. 9 This result is confirmed in our empirical analysis, 7 For this to happen, the decline in the state 1 payoff (b1 − b 1 ) cannot be too large, implying 0 < m < 1. 8 Anderson, Hodges, & Anderson (2013) find that public forest managers balance public responsiveness with technical management. 9 A salient event alters the expected benefits E(b). Applying the Implicit Function Theorem to the first-order condition revealing that residents of wildland-adjacent communities are part of the mechanism by which salient events affect the allocation of fuels management projects.
Data
To test the effects of salience on the provision of local public goods, we combine an extensive panel data set of the locations of fuels management projects on public lands with spatial data on wildfire perimeters and locations of wildland-adjacent communities. Due to the importance of wildfire management in the western U.S., we focus our attention on lands in 15 western states 10 managed by the U.S. Forest Service (USFS), Bureau of Land Management (BLM), and National Park Service (NPS). We identified these public lands using BLM and NPS boundaries (Bureau of Land Management, 2014 ) and administrative National Forest boundaries for USFS lands. Combined, our study area encompasses approximately 1.5 million square kilometers of federal land, of which the USFS and BLM manage roughly equal shares (47%), with the remaining 6% is managed by the NPS. We divided this area into a grid of 1 km × 1 km cells, since this is the approximate size of the average fuels management project in our data. These 1 km 2 cells are the units of analysis for the empirical analysis.
The fuels management data come from the National Fire Plan Operations and Reporting System (NFPORS). The NFPORS database records the point location (latitude and longitude), dates, and area of all fuels reduction projects for USFS and the Department of Interior (including BLM and NPS) lands in the years 2003-2011. Projects are classified as controlled burns, mechanical thinning, preparation for treatment, and other. Controlled burns and mechanical thinning account for 94% of the observed projects in our data. Because NFPORS does not provide the boundaries of fuels
> 0. This result shows that the salience effect depends on the population size of the community. 10 These states are Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming.
management projects, we used the reported point location and area to estimate boundaries. Using
ArcGIS, we created a polygon layer in which fuels management projects were represented by circles of the reported area, centered on the reported point location. A grid cell was designated as having received fuels reduction in a given year if the grid cell's centroid was inside of an imputed project boundary in that year.
Although the majority of land under federal management is forested (52%), there are significant areas in shrubs (39%) and grasslands (7%). 11 Our data reveal that fuels reduction projects are implemented on non-forest lands, but at a much lower rate than on forest lands. As shown in the first panel, second column of Table 1 , for the whole sample the rate of fuels reduction projects in evergreen or mixed forests is 2.5%. The rate is lower (1.1%) in deciduous forests, but still much higher than for other land cover types. Since fuels reduction activities are concentrated in evergreen and mixed forests, and the relationships between fire events, fuels reduction activities, and future fire risk are much less clear in deciduous forests and other land cover types (Keeley et al., 2009; Moritz et al., 2014) , we focus our attention hereafter on forest (evergreen and mixed forests) lands. 12
For the forest-only sample, the USFS is the dominant land management agency (83% of all grid cells), followed by the BLM (13%) and the NPS (4%).
We define wildland-adjacent communities as wildland urban interface (WUI) Census blocks, which encompass both interface, where developed residential areas directly abut large areas of wildland vegetation, and intermix, where residences are dispersed among wildland vegetation (USDA and DOI, 2001 ). Wildland urban interface data come from Radeloff et al. (2005) , who mapped U.S.
WUI areas using landcover and housing density data. For our purposes, we consider as WUI any U.S. Census block within our study region that Radeloff et al. (2005) classified as low, medium, or high density interface or intermix in 2000. Descriptive statistics for all WUI blocks in the study 11 We obtained these estimates by overlaying the National Land Cover Data for 2006 on the federal agency data described above. 12 In results not reported here, we find evidence of salience effects on non-forest lands, although it is less conclusive. region are provided in the second column of Table 2 .
Fire data come from the interdepartmental Monitoring Trends in Burn Severity (MTBS) project (Eidenshink et al., 2007) . In the western U.S., MTBS uses Landsat satellite imagery to map fire perimeters for fires larger than 1000 acres (approximately 4 km 2 ). This focus on larger fires makes sense for this study, since we expect larger fires to be most salient to the public.
Our analysis relies on two distance measures: the distance between each forested grid cell and its nearest WUI blocks and the distance between each WUI block and the nearest fire. For each cell, we calculated the straight-line distance to up to 500 of the nearest WUI blocks within a threshold distance of 10 km. Among the nearly 1.5 million grid cells in our sample, only 3,147 were matched with the maximum number of WUI blocks. Therefore, limiting the sample to the closest 500 WUI blocks is unlikely to influence our results. In a similar way, we measured the straight-line distance from each WUI block to the nearest fire in each year. Figure 1 provides the kernel density functions for our two distance measures. For forested cells, distances of less than 13 km to the nearest WUI block are the most common. The density for distances between WUI blocks and the nearest fire is roughly uniform, although the likelihood of fires within 15 km or more than 40 km is somewhat lower.
Our empirical strategy requires dropping grid cells that are not close to at least one WUI block, since we expect the placement of fuels reduction activities far from human settlement to be determined by factors other than the salience of wildfire risk (e.g., protection of timber resources).
In our main set of results, the sample consists only of grid cells closer than 5 km from the nearest WUI block. As described below, however, we test the sensitivity of our results to different definitions of closeness to WUI blocks. We find that restricting our attention to grid cells near WUI blocks has little effect on the basic characteristics of our sample. Compared to the whole sample of grid cells, the rate of fuels reduction projects increases somewhat when we consider only grid cells within 5 km of a WUI block, but the rate is still highest on forest lands (Table 1 , panel II). Restricting our attention to grid cells within 5 km of a WUI reduces the number of WUI blocks by 77%, but has little effect on average community characteristics (Table 2) .
To test whether learning can explain our results, we use a measure of vegetation condition from the Landfire project. 13 The Vegetation Condition Class (VCC) is a cardinal measure of the degree to which the current vegetation departs from simulated historical vegetation conditions. For example, the largest value of VCC corresponds to "high departure", which is indicative of a landscape on which fuels have built up due to long-term fire suppression. A fine-scale measure of the VCC is available for 2001, 2008 , and 2012, which we match to the grid cell data described above.
Further tests are conducted with measures of population and number of housing units (Table 2) . Because access to block-level U.S. Census data is restricted, these variables are measured at the Census tract level using data from the 2000 Census.
Empirical model & results

Overview
The essence of our empirical approach is to determine whether fuels management projects are more likely to occur on federal lands that are close to WUI communities that have experienced nearby wildfires. We expect wildfire risk to be more salient to WUI residents if they can observe smoke plumes, fire-fighting efforts, and possibly the fire itself. Such highly localized effects of wildfires are supported by findings in McCoy & Walsh (2014) that fires influence housing prices only if they are within 5 km.
We motivate our empirical approach with Figure 2 , which shows a small portion of our study 13 Landfire is a partnership of U.S. land management agencies to provide geospatial data on vegetation, wildland fuel, and fire regimes. See https://www.landfire.gov/about.php#planning (accessed August 31, 2017).
area in the State of Oregon. Light-shaded areas depict lands managed by federal agencies, and dark-shaded areas are Census blocks classified as WUI. The hatched area is the burn scar from a fire that occurred in 2011. We think of WUI blocks as being "treated" by close fires in the sense that the fire raises the salience of wildfire risk for residents of the WUI block. Our definition of close is varied in the empirical analysis, but for this illustration it is defined as 5 km. As such, WUI block A is treated because it is within 5 km of the fire, but WUI blocks farther than 5 km from the fire are untreated. We then consider whether there is a higher probability of fuels reduction projects occurring in close proximity to the treated WUI block. We identify all grid cells on federal lands that are within 5 km of some portion of a WUI block. Grid cells 1 and 2 meet this criterion (the radius of the solid circle is 5 km). However, only grid cell 1 is close (within 5 km) to at least one treated WUI block (WUI block A), whereas grid cell 2 is close to untreated blocks. We test whether grid cells that are close to WUI blocks that are close to fires (e.g., cell 1) are more likely to receive a fuels management project than grid cells that are close to WUI blocks that have not experienced a nearby fire (e.g., cell 2).
In place of distance to an event, some recent studies have measured salience using more direct measures of information transmission. Gallagher (2014) uses the number of local television stories on floods as a measure of media exposure. For our application, however, media markets are large relative to the scale at which we expect the effects of wildfires to operate. In the western U.S., local television media markets are comprised of many counties and, in some cases, large portions of states. 14 Furthermore, to identify effects of media coverage we would need to omit year-by-region fixed effects from our model that are defined at much smaller scales than media markets. A second We present tests, below, that strengthen our case for using distance to measure the degree of risk salience.
Main specification
As in recent applications of the difference-in-differences estimator (eg. Conley & Taber, 2011; Abrevaya & Hamermesh, 2012) , we estimate our main specification using a linear probability model. In a panel data setting, the advantage of the linear probability model is the ease of including fixed effects. In our application, fixed effects play a critical role in controlling for unobserved determinants of fuels reduction activities, such as underlying fire hazard and proximity to assets at risk.
An alternative is a binary probit or logit specification. However, including fixed effects in these models gives rise to the incidental parameters problem that renders maximum likelihood estimates inconsistent. The linear probability model is a good alternative considering that all of our regressors are dummy variables and our goal is to estimate their effects at the mean of the data (Wooldridge 2010).
The main specification of the linear probability model is:
where i, t, and s, index cells, years, and WUI blocks, respectively, and m(i) is a mapping from cell i to an aggregate geographical region (e.g., a Census tract), indexed by m. The dependent variable, y it , equals 1 if a fuels management project occurs on cell i in year t and is 0 otherwise. Specifically, f iredist s,t+ is defined as the distance to the closest fire to WUI block s that occurs in year t + . If that fire is within distance c of WUI block s and block s is in the set S i , then the indicator function equals one. The parameters of the model are α i , β , and δ tm(i) , and it is a random disturbance term. The summation term in equation (3) allows each fire to have a contemporaneous effect on the probability of fuels management projects ( = 0) and four annual lagged effects ( = -1 to -4). We examined specifications with more lags, but did not find any significant coefficients outside the range of effects in equation (3).
We identify the salience effects of wildfire based on within grid cell and within year-by-region variation. We would expect decisions about fuels management projects to be influenced by such factors as fire hazard, access, and administrative unit. We implicitly control for these time-invariant factors with cell-level fixed effects α i . 15 Time-varying factors could include macroeconomic trends affecting government budgets, fluctuations in weather, and changes in management objectives. We control for these factors with year-by-region effects δ tm(i) where regions are alternatively defined as units (USFS national forests, BLM district offices, NPS national parks), districts (USFS ranger districts, BLM field offices), counties, and Census tracts. Districts are less aggregated than units 16
and Census tracts are less aggregated than counties. These regions are sufficiently small areas so that within-region variation in fire risk trends should be minimal. 17 We also consider the degenerate case of a single region, which amounts to including year effects.
15 With fixed effects included, cells that are never included in fuels management projects have no influence on the model estimates. 16 For NPS lands, there is no region less aggregated than a unit (National Park); therefore, year-by-district fixed effects and year-by-unit fixed effects are equivalent on NPS lands. 17 We discuss potential time-varying determinants of fire risk in more detail, below, when we evaluate learning as an alternative explanation for our results.
We are concerned about the possibility of spatial autocorrelation, which can bias estimates of standard errors. If, for example, fuels reductions span more than one grid cell, then the fuels reduction status of neighboring grid cells may be correlated. To account for this possibility, we cluster the residuals in two ways, first at the district level and next at the unit level. As a check of robustness, we also estimated our main specifications with clustering at the level of Census tracts and counties. Our choice of geographic unit on which to cluster does not substantively affect our results.
The results for the main specification are reported in Table 3 . All model versions include cell fixed effects (α i ) and consider pixels and wildfires within 5 km of WUI blocks (i.e., c = d = 5km).
The models vary according to the type of year-by-region fixed effects included. Model (1) includes only year effects. We find the contemporaneous effect of a close wildfire on the probability of a fuels reduction project to be 1.6 percentage points, an estimate that is significantly different from zero at the 1% confidence level. We interpret the contemporaneous effect as an immediate response to a wildfire. 18 The effect is large relative to the average annual rate of fuels reduction projects in our sample. 19 We also find a significant effect (p < 0.05) of a close fire that occurred one year previously, but only when we cluster the errors at the district level. This effect is smaller, indicating that a fire last year raises the probability of a fuels reduction project by 0.7 percentage points. Fires that occur two, three, and four years earlier do not have significant effects.
The inclusion of year-by-region effects sharpens the results. In models (2) through (5), the contemporaneous effect remains at approximately 1.6-1.8 percentage points, but now the one-year lagged effect is significantly different from zero, whether clustering of standard errors is at the unit or district level. The results indicate that a close fire one year ago increases the probability of fuels management by 0.6 to 0.9 percentage points. In models (3), (4), and (5), longer lags do not have 18 Alternatively, fuels reduction projects could be accurately placed in anticipation of wildfires. We examine this possibility, below, with a specification that includes lead effects of wildfires, and find little evidence for it. 19 From panel II in Table 1 , the annual rate of fuels reduction projects in evergreen and mixed forests is 3.5%. significant effects; however, the two-year lag in model (2) is significantly different from zero at the 5% level when standard errors are clustered at the district level. The estimate of 0.6 is lower than the one-year lagged effect (0.8), adding further evidence that the salience of wildfire risk diminishes with the time since the fire.
Sensitivity analysis and robustness checks
We conduct sensitivity analyses and robustness checks on our main specification. The first test evaluates the sensitivity of our results to the definition of close fires (fires within a distance c of the WUI) and close cells (cells within a distance d of the WUI). Figure 3 presents the coefficients on the f iredist variable for all combinations of c = 2, 5, 10 and d = 2, 5, 10, using version (2) of the model in Table 3 . The lines in each panel correspond to different definitions of close fires and the three panels correspond to different definitions of close grid cells. For example, when we limit close fires and close cells to those within 2 km (c = d = 2; the dashed blue line in Panel A), we find that a close fire raises the probability of a fuels management project by approximately 2.5 percentage points. The effect is strong and persistent to a three-year lag (coefficient values marked by a solid triangle are significantly different from zero at the 5% level and those marked by an "x" are not).
Taken together, the results in Figure 3 provide support for the hypothesized salience mechanism and the use of distance to measure risk salience. First, fires that occur closer to WUI residents have larger effects. In all three panels, the dashed blue line, corresponding to fires within 2 km, is always above the dashed-dotted green line, corresponding to fires within 10 km. Expanding the fire proximity threshold (c) is likely to include fires that are not as salient to WUI residents. Second, for a given fire, salience effects are amplified at distances close to WUI residents. Lines in Panel A, corresponding to grid cells within 2 km of WUI blocks, tend to be higher than those in panel C, corresponding to grid cells within 10 km of WUI blocks. When we expand the size of the window around WUI blocks (d) we include fuels management projects that provide few benefits to WUI residents concerned with wildfire risk.
The second set of sensitivity analyses considers the possibility of serial correlation in our data.
There may be negative serial correlation if management agencies are less likely to undertake a fuels management project in locations where fuels have recently been reduced. On the other hand, there may be positive serial correlation if projects take more than one year to complete or if fuels management projects take place in adjacent areas over several years and we mismeasure the precise boundaries of these activities. 20 Statistics in Table 1 show that, conditional on a fuels reduction project taking place, most grid cells receive fuels management only once. However, it is not uncommon for grid cells to receive fuels management two or more times. We address serial correlation by recoding the dependent variable so that a multi-year fuels management project appears as a single-year project (Table 4) . For example, if y it = y it+1 = 1, we recode the variables as y it = 1, y it+1 = 0. In general, when we observe a cell with consecutive values of one, we set all but the first value to zero. This recoding procedure has the effect of purging the data of serial correlation due specifically to multi-year fuels reductions. We estimate all versions of the main specification with the recoded data and find little difference in the results. 21 We estimate a version of equation (3) with one-and two-year leads (Table 5) as a placebo test, as we would not expect the likelihood of observing a fuels reduction project today to be influenced by the occurrence of future fires. Significant lead effects could be due to omitted time-varying cell-level factors that are correlated with wildfires and fuels reduction projects. Formally, lead 20 This is possible given the way we define boundaries for fuels reduction projects, described in section 3. 21 Another way to test whether our results are robust to the possibility of serial correlation is with the estimator in Arellano & Bond (1991) . We estimate versions of equation (3) that include one-and two-year lagged dependent variables. The results, available from the authors upon request, provide evidence of positive serial correlation. The coefficients on the lagged dependent variables are positive and significantly different from zero. Nevertheless, we still find evidence of contemporaneous effects of close fires on the likelihood of fuels management projects. The effects of fires in previous years are no longer significant, most likely because the lagged dependent variables absorb the effects of past fires.
parameters are included by modifying the summation term in equation (3) so that takes values from -4 to 2. A finding of insignificant lead coefficients gives us further confidence that we identify causal effects of wildfires on government agency decisions and are not simply finding that agencies locate fuels management projects in areas that are likely to experience wildfires. The estimated coefficients on the lead variables are small relative to the contemporaneous and lagged parameters and not significantly different from zero with the exception of the two-year lead in models (2) and (5). Estimates of the other model coefficients are largely unaffected.
Although our data set only includes pre-fire fuels reduction projects (predominantly controlled burns and mechanical thinning), it is conceivable that some post-fire activities could be misclassified as fuels management. Soon after a fire, land managers may thin trees, clear debris, and conduct salvage logging in the area where a fire occurred. In this case, we might interpret post-fire clean-up activities as a response by managers to heightened risk salience. We guard against this possibility by dropping all observations within the perimeter of an earlier fire (Table 6 ). 22 This is likely an overly conservative approach as we may discard information about fuels reduction activities that occurred in response to a later fire occurring within the perimeter of an earlier fire. Nevertheless, we continue to find a significant contemporaneous effect and, in model (2), a one-year lagged effect that is significant at the 5% level.
Learning as an alternative to salience
An alternative interpretation of our empirical results is that government agencies learn about risks climate, and topography/vegetation -that have statistically significant effects on the probability that a given grid cell burned in a large fire. Some of these factors are not applicable to our study of public forest lands (population density and land use) and others are controlled for by the grid-cell level fixed effects (topographic roughness, road density 23 ) and year-by-region fixed effects in our model (large-scale measures of lightning strikes). Parisien et al. (2012) find that wildfire probability is predicted by a number of climate variables, including long-term temperature, precipitation, and wind speed means. It is conceivable that weather distributions changed over the period of analysis (i.e., climate change occurred) or that there were sustained periods of weather anomalies such as droughts or extended rainy periods. Wildfires may have alerted land managers to the effects of these events on future fire risk. However, because climate change and weather anomalies tend to be large-scale phenomena, they are also controlled for by the year-by-region fixed effects. 24 The smallest region used in our analysis is the Census tract, which has an average size of 364 km 2 . For comparison, the area of the Isle of Wight in the United Kingdom is 380 km 2 and Lake Tahoe in the USA is 495 km 2 in size.
Although we expect the fixed effects in our model to control for the key determinants of fire risk, we provide a formal analysis using the Vegetation Condition Class (VCC) measure described above. The VCC indicates the amount of fuels on the landscape and, thus, the potential for severe wildfires. If managers learn about vegetation conditions from local wildfires and the fixed effects in our model do not adequately control for fire risk, then the response to a nearby wildfire should be magnified when there are heavy fuel loads. We investigate this hypothesis by interacting the VCC 23 Parisien et al. (2012) indicate that there was little year-to-year variation in topographic roughness and road densities over the period , which mostly covers our study period. 24 Parisien et al. (2012) find that the capacity of a site to produce biomass, measured as gross primary productivity, is also associated with wildfires, but indicate that productivity is largely determined by climate.
variable with the treatment variable:
where V CC i,t+ is the condition class for cell i in year t + and ζ is a model parameter. If the estimate of ζ is positive and significantly different from zero, then the effect of a wildfire on the probability of a fuels management project increases with fuels loads. However, results in Table 7 reveal an insignificant effect of VCC, in opposition to the learning model. 25 The original estimates of the β coefficients are unchanged when we include the VCC interaction term.
Additional support for the salience mechanism
To provide additional support for salience, we show that the effects of close fires vary with characteristics of WUI communities and the size of fires. We estimate two sets of models with interactions similar to (4). 26 The first version is specified:
where z s is a characteristic of WUI block s or of the fire that treats block s. We define z s as, alternatively, the population of the Census tract, the number of housing units in the Census tract, and logged fire size. 27 The second version of the model in (5) includes VCC as a control for objective 25 In equation (4), ζ is restricted to be the same for the contemporaneous and lagged effects. We use this parsimonious specification because we do not have strong a priori reasons to expect the marginal effects of VCC to differ by the length of the lag. We estimated alternative models that allow each lag to have a different coefficient. Based on F -tests reported in Table 7 , we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients are equal. 26 As in equation (4), ζ is restricted to be the same for the contemporaneous and lagged effects. According to F -tests reported in Table 7 , we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients are equal. 27 We estimate the fire size version of the model with the sample used to produce Table 6 . A large fire could augment fire risk. Table 7 reveal that the effects of a close wildfire are larger as the population and the number of housing units increase. The finding that salience effects vary with community characteristics confirms a prediction of our theoretical model and shows that local residents are part of the salience mechanism (see also Anderson, Hodges, & Anderson (2013) ). The results are consistent with the preferences of residents being shaped by salient events or with government officials being affected by salience and operating on behalf of residents. The coefficient for fire size is positive but significantly different from zero at only the 8% level. The lack of significance may be due to the fact that the fire data we use only includes relatively large fires. Finally, we find that the effects of resident characteristics and fire size are unchanged when we control for landscape conditions with the VCC variable. This suggests that fuels management decisions depend on the risks perceived by WUI residents rather than on objective risks.
Results in
Conclusions
The economics literature on salience has focused on how consumption of private goods is affected by salient features of the choice problem. In this paper, we extend this literature to examine how salience can affect the government provision of public goods. In our theoretical model, the benefits from a local public good are represented as a lottery. An exogenous shock makes a payoff more salient to residents of a community, causing them to over-weight the payoff in the salient state and miscalculate expected benefits. If the government bases its provision of the public good on expected benefits as expressed by the residents, then the allocation of the good will be inefficient. Samuelson (1954) recognized that the public may have incentives to misrepresent their preferences for a public good. In addition, there has been a long-running debate among economists about salience but also limit the area available for fuels treatments. By using the restricted sample, our estimate measures only the first effect.
whether preferences for public goods can be reliably determined using direct elicitation methods (Diamond & Hausman, 1994; Hanemann, 1994; Carson, 2012; Hausman, 2012) . In our case, the problem faced by the government is not deceit or flawed survey methods, but rather that the preferences expressed by the public have been biased by exogenous events.
The theoretical model in our paper provides insights into the nature of the inefficiency. We show that the allocation of the public good can increase even when the shock decreases one of the payoffs, which necessarily means that the true expected value of the good has declined. If the shock affects the higher-valued payoff, then enough weight can be shifted to this payoff such that the public's expected value for the good increases. This outcome is more likely to occur when the salience effect is large.
This result matches our empirical application, where we find support for the salience theory of public goods provision. We find that federal land management agencies in the western U.S. are more likely to locate fuels management projects near communities that have experienced a nearby wildfire. This increased response comes even as the recent wildfire has likely decreased the likelihood of loss from future fires. With our main specification, we estimate that the probability of a fuels management project increases by 1.6 to 1.8 percentage points in the year the fire occurs, declining to 0.6 to 0.9 percentage points in the year after the fire. These are relatively large changes considering that the average annual rate of fuels management projects on all forested lands in our sample is approximately 3.5% (see footnote 19). Our finding that the effects of the nearby wildfire attenuate after one or two years does not necessarily mean that the salience of fire risk has diminished, as suggested by the results in McCoy & Walsh (2014) . Our results are also consistent with a prompt response by the government that satisfies the increased demand for fuels management. One way to investigate the dynamics of salience would be to consider WUI blocks that experience nearby fires in multiple years and see how the effects change over time. For this analysis we would need a data set covering a longer time period.
The results of robustness checks support our claim that we identify salience effects. First, we find that the effects of nearby wildfires on the likelihood of observing fuels managment projects are strengthened when we focus our analysis on closer fires, which should be more salient to WUI residents (Figure 3 ). The effects also increase when we consider grid cells closer to WUI communities, suggesting that the federal agencies are responding to heightened demand for fuels management projects. Second, we find that effects of nearby wildfires increase with the population of the WUI community and the number of housing units (Table 8 ). These results suggest that the residents of WUI communities are part of the mechanism for determining the location of fuels management projects, consistent with our salience theory. Finally, we find evidence that contradicts alternative explanations for our results. The finding of insignificant coefficients on lead variables suggests that agencies are not simply locating fuels management projects in places that are likely to have fires.
As well, our finding that vegetation condition does not magnify the effects of nearby fires guards against the possibility that our results reflect learning by agencies about the risk of future fires.
In addition to local public goods such as fuels management on public lands, salience could affect the government provision of national-level public goods. There are many examples of salient events that act as a catalyst for government action. In response to the Exxon Valdez oil spill in 1989, the U.S. Congress passed the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 that required double hulls on oil tankers. The Three Mile Island nuclear accident in 1979 led to stricter controls on nuclear plants and the outbreak of West Nile virus in New York City in 1999 prompted the creation of a national surveillance system for infectious diseases in the U.S. Catastrophic flooding of the Mississippi River has often been followed by government-funded levee building and other channel engineering projects (Wright, 2000) . These may be rational responses by the government to new information about the demand for public goods. However, our paper offers an alternative explanation. The public's demand may be distorted by the salience of the catalyzing event, which would mean that the government response to heightened demand for public goods is inefficient. Note: Row I presents the coefficients on the population, housing units, fire size, and vegetation condition class (VCC) interaction terms as specified in Equations (4) and (5). Each estimating equation is otherwise the same as the model in column 3 of Table 3 . Row II presents the interaction coefficients from estimating equations that include a control for VCC, whose coefficient is reported below. Robust standard errors are clustered by unit, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. Reported F-statistics use results from an unreported regression to test the null hypothesis that estimated ζ coefficients from regressions in row I are equal across lags of the interaction. An F-statistic less than 3.00 indicates insufficient evidence that ζ coefficients differ among lags. The reported mean, maximum, and minimum in each column correspond to sample statistics for each each column's variable (z s ) among all treated blocks.
